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ABSTRACT
Researchers attempting to explain and treat psychiatric disorders have long discussed the
need for new disorder categories. A common proposal is to develop a causal classification
system whereby psychiatric disorders are classified according to the causal processes that
produce and sustain them. I evaluate the prospects for causal classification of psychiatric
disorders. First, I motivate the need for a causal classification system of psychiatric disorders.
Second, I introduce one framework for causal classification, the exemplar model. Third, I
examine multiple forms of causal complexity that the exemplar model must successfully
navigate if it is to be a viable classification model for psychiatry. I argue that the exemplar model
can handle some issues of causal complexity but not others. I conclude that psychiatry should
utilize two models of classification, the exemplar model and the network model, because each
fulfills some, but not all, of the purposes of classification systems.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Psychiatric nosology is often said to be in a state of crisis. Disorder categories are largely
thought to be invalid. As a result, researchers are left with improper targets for research, and
clinicians are less prepared to understand and address the problems their patients face. Many
experts blame the flawed methodology used for classification by the American Psychiatric
Association (APA) to develop the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)
(APA, 2013). In response, several authors have attempted to articulate principles for a new
classification system. Primarily, these authors desire a classification system that integrates causal
information. This thesis will motivate the need for a causal classification system and assess the
challenges involved in creating one. In particular, I will focus on Dominic Murphy’s exemplar
model of disorder classification for psychiatry (Murphy, 2006). The challenges I address
primarily relate to causal complexity and heterogeneity. To account for the difficulties faced by
the exemplar model, I argue that classification must also rely on network models.
Before motivating the need for a causal classification system, it will help to briefly
summarize the APA’s approach to classification in the DSM. The DSM is a classification of
mental disorders designed for clinicians aimed at providing “reliable” and “accurate” diagnoses
(APA, 2013, p. xli). The DSM uses diagnostic criteria to assist clinicians with making a
diagnosis. These diagnostic criteria include “symptoms, behaviors, cognitive functions,
personality traits, physical signs, syndrome combinations, and durations” (ibid., p. 5). Clinicians
are supposed to be able to use these diagnostic criteria to determine a reliable diagnosis in the
sense that it could be widely agreed upon throughout the clinical community. The DSM does not
use information about the causes of disorders as criteria for sorting psychiatric phenomena into
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categories. DSM categories merely sort individuals according to their signs and symptoms.1
Therefore, the utility of DSM categories is that they allow clinicians to communicate about
patients’ clinical presentation.
The APA’s stated motivations for a classification system go beyond merely
communicating about patients’ clinical presentation, however. These motivations include
“guiding treatment recommendations, identifying prevalence rates for mental health service
planning, identifying patient groups for clinical and basic research, and documenting important
public health information...” (APA, 2013, p. 5). Already we have some tension: while it is
explicitly stated that the DSM is for clinical use, DSM categories are also supposed to provide
explanatory targets for researchers. While this is not a necessary tension–indeed, researchers and
clinicians must ultimately share a common language–the failure of the DSM to provide suitable
explanatory targets does undermine the utility of its diagnostic categories for clinicians. When
researchers struggle to explain and provide interventions for clinical phenomenon, the ability of
clinicians to treat their patients is undermined.
The APA is aware of the frustration felt towards its nosology. Specifically, the APA
acknowledges that high comorbidity rates motivate concern regarding the validity of its
categories, which it defines as “the degree to which diagnostic criteria reflect the comprehensive
manifestation of an underlying psychopathological disorder” (APA, 2013, p. 5). While the
DSM’s curators likely believe that continued scientific progress will be sufficient for
ameliorating these concerns, many believe that the problem is too deep to be rectified without
radically rethinking how we approach classification in psychiatry.

1

Whereas signs are measurable, symptoms are felt but unmeasurable indicators of disorders.
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The remainder of this thesis will proceed as follows. Section two will motivate the need
for a causal classification system and introduce a few ways psychiatric research has already
moved in this direction. In doing so, I will also demonstrate the problems with the DSM
approach to classification. Section three will introduce a model for causal classification in
psychiatry, namely, Murphy’s exemplar model. Section four will present several challenges to
causal classification. The challenges have to do with two kinds of causal complexity, namely,
multicausality and causal heterogeneity (Ross, forthcoming). I argue that the exemplar model
does well at handling multicausality but struggles to address causal heterogeneity. I introduce
another model of classification, the network model, which is better at representing causal
heterogeneity. Finally, section five will discuss alternative ways of thinking about classification
in psychiatry. I argue for a pluralist approach that embraces both the exemplar and network
models of classification.
2

MOTIVATIONS FOR A CAUSAL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

This section will examine problems with the DSM classification system, specifically
focusing on the issues that causal classification systems aim to redress. As such, there are several
problems the DSM faces that I will not address. Briefly, these problems include (1) the
demarcation between psychiatry and related fields in medicine and the cognitive sciences, (2) the
statement of clear principles for determining when something qualifies as a disease or disorder,
and (3) issues of transparency and conflicts of interest.2 While these are important conceptual
and procedural issues, adopting a causal classification system does not address them. For this
reason, I proceed by examining the issues of comorbidity and heterogeneity. These problems
relate to concerns regarding the in/validity of DSM categories. The notion of validity that I’m

2

The work of Rachel Cooper often focuses on these issues; in particular see Cooper (2005; 2014). Also see the first
three chapters of Murphy (2006).
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working with corresponds to what Caroline Stone calls “construct legitimacy” (2019).3 A
construct, such as a disorder category, is legitimate to the extent that the theory that posits the
construct is justified. Since the theory we are examining is our theory of classification, our
disorder categories’ legitimacy rises and falls with the justification for our classification
principles.4 After reviewing the issues with DSM constructs, I will present two alternative ways
of grouping phenomena suggestive of principles we may use to construct an alternative
classification system.
2.1

Comorbidity
Comorbidity is perhaps one of the most consistently discussed and pervasive issues in

psychiatry. A comorbid patient suffers from two or more distinct illnesses. For example,
someone suffering from both Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) and Generalized Anxiety
Disorder (GAD) is comorbid. From a theoretical standpoint, high comorbidity rates demand an
explanation. Why do so many individuals suffer from both MDD and GAD? Rather than try to
answer that question directly, many approach high comorbidity rates from a different angle: do
high comorbidity rates result from the fact that we do not have valid disease categories? If this
latter possibility is the case, then comorbidity is an artefact of our current classification system.
Lecavalier et al. (2019) review studies of comorbidity in children with ASD. They note
that comorbidity rates are high but that the exact percentage varies significantly. One study
suggests that the number of children with concomitant psychiatric disorders could be as high as
92%, and another argues it is more likely around 41% (p. 58). Of the ASD children with

3

Stone distinguishes between construct validity, construct legitimacy, and existence claims. Construct validity
concerns the relation between measures and the construct. Construct legitimacy concerns the nature of the construct
itself. Lastly, existence claims concern the relation between constructs in reality. (Stone notes that realists might not
always distinguish between construct legitimacy and existence claims; I remain agnostic as to the question of
realism).
4
In keeping with the majority of the literature, I refer to construct legitimacy in terms of “validity” from here on out.
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concomitant psychiatric disorders, 66.1% had two or more comorbidities. The authors comment
that evidence of high rates “raises questions about uncertainty of the boundaries between
psychiatric diagnoses in children” (p. 58). Furthermore, they suggest some pushback against the
DSM-III method of criteria-driven categorical diagnosis and ask whether comorbidities are
distinct conditions or “variable phenotypic manifestations of ASD” (p. 62).
It is common in discussions of psychiatric comorbidity for the authors to suggest
revisions to the nosology. Implicit in the critiques leveled by Lecavalier et al. is skepticism (at
best) of the categories created on the basis of clinical presentation. Supposing that various
comorbidities with distinct presentations might be variations of the same disease category (ASD)
as the authors suggest, one naturally wonders what exactly unites them under the same category.
An article by van Loo et al. (2013) examines some of the literature discussing comorbidity. They
argue that much of the work in this area assumes that high comorbidity rates result from our
current classification system lacking a causal structure. Therefore, a reclassification of disorder
categories based on causal factors might reduce comorbidity rates by eliminating artificial
comorbidities.
Examining the work of Andrews et al. (2009), van Loo et al. construct the following
argument for how common causes can account for high rates of comorbidity: (2013, p. 749)
1. The fact in need of explanation is that two diseases d1 and d2 occur far more
frequently [together] than their separate frequencies suggest, i.e., they have high rates
of comorbidity.
2. If there is a common cause C for the two diseases d1 and d2, then their high rates of
comorbidity are to be expected.
Therefore,
3. It is plausible that the two diseases d1 and d2 have a common cause C.
Andrews et al. were taking part in a DSM-V initiative to produce a more parsimonious clustering
of DSM diagnoses. They took high comorbidity rates within a cluster to be a “validating factor,”
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i.e., evidence that the cluster mapped onto real similarities between diagnostic categories rather
than superficial ones. Using high comorbidity rates to cluster diagnoses into categories that likely
have shared causal mechanisms can be seen as conservative. Others argue that high comorbidity
rates indicate that current disease categories cannot possibly be maintained as researchers search
for explanatory mechanisms. Van Loo et al. attribute this view to Kendell and Jablensky (2003).
I will return to this issue of understanding high comorbidity rates in section five. For now, let us
take note that high comorbidity rates raise concerns about the validity of current diagnostic
categories and are a consequence of the DSM’s failure to integrate causal information into their
classification system.
2.2

Heterogeneity
I now turn our focus to the heterogeneity of DSM diagnostic categories. To do this, I will

enlist the work of philosopher Kathryn Tabb. Tabb authored a series of papers (2015; 2019) in
which she argued that current diagnostic categories are not proper objects of study for psychiatric
research. Her arguments rely heavily on the heterogeneity of these categories. Furthermore, she
presents and defends the so-called “precision turn” in psychiatric research. Like those regarding
comorbidity, issues regarding heterogeneity result from the invalidity of current psychiatric
categories and the system that created those categories.
Tabb rejects what she calls “the assumption of diagnostic discrimination,” which is the
assumption that psychiatry’s diagnostic categories are suitable explanatory targets (2015, p.
1049). In support of this thesis, Tabb enlists the work of Olbert, Gala, and Tupler (2014), who
share many of Tabb’s concerns. Their work is critical of the polythetic diagnostic criteria for
categories such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) or MDD. The DSM-V includes long
lists of signs and symptoms for these disorders, with patients fitting the criteria for a diagnosis if
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they exhibit some specified amount of the listed signs and symptoms. As a result, there are
636,120 possible profiles of someone diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, 227 for
MDD, and 32,647 for Conduct Disorder (CD) (Olbert, Gala, and Tupler, 2014, p. 457). Two
people sharing one of these diagnoses might share few or no symptoms. Additionally, the authors
note that, on average, two possible symptom combinations will share fewer than half of their
symptoms. For decades, researchers have had relatively little success in discovering the
etiologies of these heterogeneous psychiatric disorders. These considerations lead Tabb to
conclude that “little of interest from the perspective of biomedicine can be discovered about
patients sharing a diagnosis” (2015, p. 1051).
Tabb offers a historical argument against this assumption of diagnostic discrimination,
which rests on the observation that the DSM categories have mainly gone unchanged throughout
its various iterations. The DSM began as and largely continues to be a nosology based on
conventional wisdom from clinical practices (2015, pp. 1050–1051). The observation offered
here is that the current psychiatric classification system creates categories according to patient
symptomatology. These classification practices have produced the polythetic diagnostic criteria
for the categories analyzed by Olbert, Gala, and Tupler. We should consider these classification
principles and diagnostic criteria as responsible for these categories’ wild heterogeneity.
Consequently, we should welcome efforts to develop new classification principles. A causal
classification system promises to systematically sort psychiatric phenomena into categories that
provide researchers with valid targets for scientific explanation.
2.3

Research Domain Criteria (RDoC)
In response to growing concerns about the validity of current diagnostic categories, the

National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) designed the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC).
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RDoC encourages researchers to investigate a particular construct relating to a functional domain
along a specific unit of analysis (Insel et al., 2010). Examples of constructs include negative or
positive emotionality, cognition, arousal, etc. Units of analysis refer to whether the constructs are
being investigated at the genetic, cellular, neural circuitry level, etc. RDoC’s website specifically
lists heterogeneity and comorbidity of the sort discussed here as among the reasons for
developing the new framework (About RDoC, n.d.). Proceeding from the observation that
decades of research for the biological mechanisms of DSM diagnostic categories have borne
little success, the framers of RDoC hypothesize that grouping phenomena differently will prove
more successful. Rather than searching for genetic underpinnings of Bipolar disorder, for
example, a researcher might search for genetic underpinnings of finer-grained phenomena such
as negative valence or low arousal. Participants for such a study would be expected to span
multiple DSM diagnostic categories, perhaps including Bipolar disorder, MDD, and GAD.
Thomas Insel, the director of NIMH at the time, recognizes that RDoC is not in itself a
framework for classification: “RDoC is not a diagnostic system, it’s merely a framework for
organizing research” (Insel, 2014, p. 396). The goal is “to create a framework for research on
pathophysiology, especially for genomics and neuroscience, which ultimately will inform future
classification schemes” (Insel et al., 2010, p. 748). A new classification system, in turn, ought to
foster improved patient outcomes because, according to the NIMH, diagnostic categories ought
to pick out groups of people for which we can devise strategies for treatment and predict their
response to such treatment. If RDoC is successful in increasing our knowledge of the
pathophysiology of mental distresses, then presumably, we should be much better situated with
regards to identifying disorder categories homogenous enough to make such inferences.

9
2.4

Endophenotypes
Beauchaine and Constantino (2017) argue that identifying and researching

endophenotypes will be a fruitful endeavor for psychiatrists. Endophenotypes are physical
markers at a level of description between genotype and phenotype. While endophenotypes were
initially defined as disorder-specific (Gottesman and Gould, 2003), Beauchaine and Constantino
argue that we should drop this requirement. Their reasoning relates to the unreliability of current
diagnostic categories and to the (related) possibility that divergent phenotypes share underlying
vulnerabilities. Thus defined, an endophenotype has the following properties (taken from
Beauchaine and Constantino, 2017, pp. 770–771):
•
•
•
•
•
•

They segregate with illness in the general population
They are heritable
They are state-independent
They cosegregate with the disorder within families
They present at a higher rate within affected families than in the general population
They are capable of being measured reliably and are specific to the illness of interest

State-independence refers to when a specific sign is present regardless of whether the individual
currently presents symptoms. Low brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) in bipolar
individuals cannot serve as an endophenotype since low BDNF levels are only observed during
manic episodes and thus are not state-independent (ibid., pp. 771–772). Though endophenotypes
are heritable, they cosegregate with the disorder, meaning they will be present in family
members suffering from psychiatric disorder and absent in those without that psychiatric
disorder. Endophenotypes should not be conflated with pathognomonic signs, which are physical
markers necessary and sufficient for demonstrating the presence of a particular disorder, or
biomarkers, which are not state-independent (ibid., pp. 770, 772).
To demonstrate the potential usefulness of the endophenotype concept, Beauchaine and
Constantino use the example of deficits in affect dopamine neurotransmission (DA). Noting that
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some genes related to DA are expressed heavily in the striatum, they link DA deficits and
deficits in striatal responses during decision-making. These deficits can be observed across
diagnoses, including ADHD, MDD, and CD (2017, p. 773). Identifying DA deficits as an
endophenotype serves to provide a suitably fine-grained target for research. This includes
research investigating the genetic correlates of DA deficits as well as further research into the
role of DA deficits in mechanisms contributing to psychiatric illness. Understanding the genetics
of DA deficits could prove more achievable than understanding the genetics of a complex and
heterogeneous disorder such as ADHD and could provide suitable targets for medical
intervention. As with RDoC, identifying and researching endophenotypes does not offer us new
principles for disease classification. Endophenotypes might be crucial for understanding
abnormal mental events and processes, but how they relate to the way we classify people into
disease categories is yet to be worked out. We will return to this question in section five.
3

THE EXEMPLAR MODEL OF CLASSIFICATION

The previous section motivated the need for a causal classification system by highlighting
the failures and deficiencies of the current symptom-based approach. This section will explicate
how the exemplar approach handles causal classification amidst causal complexity. I begin with
a general exposition of the model before demonstrating how it departs from the DSM’s methods.
3.1

Exemplar Model of Classification
Dominic Murphy develops and defends the exemplar model of disorder classification for

psychiatry. He defines an exemplar as “a representation of the clinical features and typical course
of a disorder, abstracted away from the detail of individual variation” (Murphy, 2006, p. 202).
Exemplars are idealizations meant to strike a balance between representing the shared processes
that cause and sustain a disorder and the diverse processes that can lead to different
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manifestations of those shared mechanisms. As a classification system, the exemplar model uses
exemplars to represent categories of disorder that can be differentiated on the basis of shared
causal processes. Exemplars will represent etiological and pathological processes shared across
instances of the disorder category but will abstract away from differences in etiology and
pathology.5 Regarding the representation of symptom profiles, an exemplar would include “all
the symptoms that a patient might show” (ibid., p. 206). Using the exemplar model involves
matching an individual’s symptom profile to some subset of those represented by the exemplar
and then determining whether the individual’s disorder is caused by the etiological and
pathological processes that define the category.6
Explanation in psychiatry involves explaining the processes causing and sustaining a
disorder and explaining the relationship between these causal processes and the various
manifestations that a patient may present.7 It is in this way that exemplars have causal
information built into them. The etiology of a disorder, i.e., the processes that cause the disorder,
is explicitly modeled as explaining a patient’s pathology, which explains a patient’s
symptomatology. Of course, these relationships, as represented by the exemplar, are
idealizations. Causal etiological factors can only ever roughly explain a patient’s pathology. A
complete explanation would have to take into account all aspects of a patient’s biological history.
This sort of explanation would be impossible and applicable to only a single individual. For this

5

Patients rarely, if ever, share exactly the same etiology or pathology. Exemplars abstract away from individual
differences while representing shared etiological and pathological processes. This is related to explanation in the
following paragraph.
6
Often, an individual’s symptom profile will match some subset of many disorders. This is precisely why
symptomatology is a poor way to classify psychiatric disorders. With the exemplar model, determining the disorder
a patient suffers from will come down to an understanding of the etiological and pathological processes causing and
sustaining the disorder.
7
I am intentionally vague here about what exactly these explanations might look like and what would count as an
explanation. I remain open to a diverse array of explanatory models e.g., mechanistic, computational, topological
explanations etc.
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reason, we depend upon idealizations that allow us to make generalizations across individuals
and focus on the causal difference makers. These causal difference-makers mark important ways
in which a disordered individual deviates from a healthy one and are the building blocks of
etiology.
The exemplar model relies on causal discrimination in at least two ways. First, the
exemplar model requires us to have the means, empirically, to discriminate between causal
processes. Therefore, if we desire a causal classification system, we need to be capable of
determining the causes of clinical phenomena. Second, we must have the means, conceptually, to
determine when we can support a distinction between two disorders on the basis of differential
causal processes. The complications related to this second conceptual dimension of causal
discrimination will be presented in section four and relate to causal complexity. In brief, what
might be thought to be distinct disorders could plausibly share several causal processes and
individual instances of what is classified as the same disorder might not always share all the
same causal processes as other instances of that disorder. We will need to be precise in
articulating conditions for when we should distinguish between separate disorders versus when
to not distinguish disorders despite some differences in the causal processes producing them.
Murphy is relatively optimistic about our ability, empirically, to discriminate differential
causal processes. Addressing the objection that a causal classification system is impractical for
psychiatry because we have so little an understanding of the causes of psychiatric disorders,
Murphy points out that causal understanding is not necessary for causal discrimination. For
causal discrimination, all we need to know is that the causal processes underlying and sustaining
a disorder are different from the causal processes underlying and sustaining other disorders. We
do not need to have a complete (or even partial) understanding of the causal processes; we only
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need to know they are distinct from others. Some methods useful for inferring differential causal
processes include double dissociations and differential reactions to pharmaceutical interventions
(Murphy, 2006, p. 322). Murphy emphasizes the importance of predictive validity in this context.
If we have correctly isolated a distinct disorder, then we ought to be able to make some
predictive inferences about how the disorder will unfold.
Before discussing these examples, it is important to clarify that we classify diseases, not
people. The idea is not to examine a patient and decide upon the single best diagnosis for them.
Rather, we attempt to detect specific causal processes occurring within the patient and classify
whatever disorder(s) they are suffering from. As Murphy notes, a patient may fit several
exemplars (2006, p. 346). Fitting several exemplars would mean that several distinct causal
processes are relevant for explaining the patient’s symptoms and the course the disorder will
take.
To demonstrate how causal discrimination can be used to distinguish disorder categories,
Murphy works out his theory using the examples of pediatric autoimmune neuropsychiatric
disorders associated with streptococcus (PANDAS), OCD, and Sydenham’s chorea. Sydenham’s
chorea is characterized by a very particular “dance” and results from rare complications to
untreated streptococcus infection. After noticing that many patients with Sydenham’s chorea also
presented with symptoms of OCD, researchers investigated whether children with OCD also
showed signs of a streptococcus infection. The result was the discovery of a new disorder:
PANDAS. What distinguishes PANDAS from childhood OCD is the etiological agent–the
streptococcus infection– present in PANDAS but absent in OCD. This case thus offers an
example of how a causal taxonomy can distinguish between two disorders based on etiology. On
the other hand, PANDAS and Sydenham’s chorea share parts of their etiology but have
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important differences in pathology (Murphy, 2006, 352–353). Pathology too, then, can be used to
support distinctions in a causal classification system.
Having outlined the exemplar model of disease classification, I now wish to elucidate the
relationship between an exemplar and an individual. We should be careful to note that there is
never a perfect fit between the disease represented by the exemplar and an instantiation of that
disease in any given patient. Murphy states that diagnosis involves “fitting a patient to a portion
of the exemplar” (2006, p. 206). Since an exemplar contains a description of all the symptoms a
patient with the condition might show, patients will only ever conform to parts of the exemplar.
When relating exemplars to individuals, we should also be careful to remember that exemplars
are idealizations of processes that occur within individuals. Since an exemplar involves
abstraction from detail, an exemplar will never contain all the relevant information relating a
patient to their condition. What is important for diagnosis is that by matching an individual to a
portion of an exemplar, we can gain an understanding of the causal processes underlying the
patient’s condition. Doing so would then raise the possibility of investigating strategies for
therapeutic intervention.
3.2

The Exemplar Model vs. DSM
As was mentioned earlier, the DSM does not utilize causal information. Still, one might

wonder how radical a revision the exemplar model would prove to be. Might many DSM
categories remain? Murphy acknowledges that some categories may remain but for different
reasons. The categories that survive the shift to exemplar categorization are those that already
pick out entities that are relatively causally homogenous. That the DSM may pick out some such
categories is to be expected. Observing differences in presentation, after all, is one way of
detecting different etiological and pathological processes. The problem is that this method is not
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precise. Similar presentations are often causally heterogeneous and divergent presentations can
sometimes share important causal processes. I explore these possibilities in section four.
Even though some categories may survive the shift to exemplar classification, those
categories will exist as exemplars for very different reasons than in DSM classification.
Remember that the DSM creates categories based merely on clinical presentation. This is
because the many goals of the DSM are held together by the requirement of inter-rater
agreement. Clinicians should be able to agree about what category or categories of disorder a
patient is suffering from. While this goal has many pragmatic benefits, the heterogeneity of DSM
categories, which I discussed in section two, undermines many of them. The goal of exemplar
classification, on the other hand, is to create categories on the basis of shared causal processes.
The hope is that doing so will group phenomena together in more productive ways.
4

CHALLENGES FOR A CAUSAL CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

The previous section presented the Exemplar Model of classification for psychiatry. This
section will introduce several challenges brought by causal classification. These challenges
involve the causal complexity of mental health conditions. Section four begins with a conceptual
distinction that will help us understand these causal complexities. After introducing this
distinction, I will introduce empirical work from developmental psychopathology and psychiatric
genetics that provide examples of causal complexity. Along the way I will evaluate how the
exemplar model handles these cases.
4.1

Multicausality and Heterogeneity
Lauren Ross (forthcoming) provides a valuable discussion of what is meant by “causal

complexity.” She notes that causal complexity can be assessed both at the type-level and the
token-level, where a type is a particular disease or diagnosis. A token is a particular instance of
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that disease (in an individual). Causal complexity at the type-level occurs when different
instances (tokens) of the disease arise from different causes, meaning there is not a single cause
defining the type. Ross calls this causal heterogeneity. Causal complexity at the token-level
occurs when multiple distinct causes contribute to the manifestation of the disease in any given
individual. Ross calls this multicausality.
To help distinguish between complexity at the type and token-levels, keep in mind that
multicausality at the token level can be homogenous at the type-level. In such an instance,
though there is causal complexity in the sense that multiple distinct causes contribute to the
manifestation of the disease in an individual, these causes are shared across all instances of the
disease. Conversely, there could be a causally heterogeneous disease ⎯ meaning that the causes
of the disease are different across tokens⎯ but always monocausal⎯ meaning there is always a
single distinct cause in a given individual. Causal complexity at the type-level does not
determine causal complexity at the token-level and vice versa. Many psychiatric phenomena
exhibit both causal complexity and causal heterogeneity. Section 4.2 explores instances of
multicausality and causal heterogeneity as researched in developmental psychopathology.
4.2

Developmental Psychopathology
Developmental psychopathology studies the development of psychiatric disorders from

childhood into adulthood, focusing on neurodevelopment (Beauchaine, Constantino, and
Hayden, 2018). Central to the practice of developmental psychopathology are equifinality and
multifinality. Equifinality describes instances where different starting points and processes reach
the same outcome. Multifinality occurs when shared or similar causal factors reach differential
outcomes (Cicchetti and Rogosch, 1996; Beauchaine, Constantino, and Hayden, 2018). In other
words, multifinality describes variations in how some entity functions in relation to the
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environment in which that entity operates. The methods and commitments of developmental
psychopathology are helpful for understanding how we might make sense of causal complexity
and heterogeneity. One particular area where developmental psychopathology has made progress
is in understanding and predicting the development of externalizing disorders through childhood,
adolescence, and adulthood. I will now turn to this literature.
To highlight the interdisciplinarity of developmental psychopathology approaches and to
illustrate their utility for psychiatry, Beauchaine, Constantino, and Hayden (2018) utilize
research into the risk-conferring genetic and environmental influences of attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and conduct disorder (CD). Their neurodevelopmental model of
externalizing behavior centers around disrupted striatal activity. It considers genetic risk factors,
epigenetic regulation of neural function, neurohormonal changes, environmental factors such as
in utero hypoxic events, and social factors such as wealth and crime levels. Genetic risk factors,
epigenetic influences, and neurohormonal deficits together account for an individual’s liability to
developing some trait, in this case, blunted striatal function.8 Abnormal striatal functioning
results in irritable, anhedonic psychological states, resulting in impulsive, reward-seeking
behaviors (147).
The move from similar or shared genetic and neural risk factors to multifinal outcomes in
Beauchaine, Constantino, and Hayden’s model is accounted for by differential
neurodevelopmental maturation and social-environmental conditions. In particular, they argue
that “[a]lthough specific neural networks differ, both neuromaturation of the PFC and efficiency
of sub-cortical connectivity become increasingly compromised across development in

“Liability” refers to an individual’s total risk for showing a disease phenotype. Individual risk factors, e.g. a
genetic mutation, increase one’s liability by a certain degree. Some risk factors will confer only a small increase in
one’s liability, while others will confer a larger risk.
8
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internalizing and externalizing disorders” (149). This is important because it pinpoints the locus
of the distinction between ADHD and more progressed externalizing disorders, such as CD,
oppositional defiant disorder (ODD), or even substance abuse. More progressed externalizing
disorders are associated with disrupted PFC maturation and subcortical connectivity beyond that
seen in ADHD. The question then becomes focused on the causal factors that give rise to the
differential outcomes, i.e., those with “just” ADHD and those with more progressed
externalizing disorders. The authors’ model emphasizes social-environmental factors such as
parenting style and socio-economic factors such as poverty, neighborhood crime rates, and
educational opportunities. The model refers to such factors as risk mediators (149).
The model developed by Beauchaine and Constantino allows us the opportunity to
understand the challenges involved in crafting a causal classification system. Their model is
multicausal: A variety of genetic factors combine with social-environmental risk mediators to
determine one’s liability to a phenotype. Faced with multicausality, the challenge for a causal
classification system becomes determining which causes will demarcate one disease category
from another. Some questions are whether and to what extent might two disease categories share
causes? Do we always demarcate disease categories according to their cause(s) at, say, the
genetic “level,” or might some categories be distinguished based on more proximal causes? If we
put aside the complexities with the genetic, neurohormonal, and (nonsocial) environmental
factors, the externalizing disorders might seem relatively homogenous until the onset of
neurodevelopmental delays in the PFC.
The causal complexity of Beauchaine and Constantino’s developmental model of the
externalizing disorders affords us an opportunity to disentangle how exemplars abstract away
from the details of individual variation and how they distinguish the importance of various
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causes for classification. While the genetic and neurohormonal causes of the externalizing
disorders are similar and shared across individuals, pointing to any single or small subset of
causes contributing to these disorders would entail a certain level of abstraction. Those causes
picked out would have to be shared across all instances but would not fully explain any one
individual’s disorder, since each individual will exhibit multicausality and there will be some
degree of causal heterogeneity across individuals. Such causal complexities are the very thing the
exemplar model allows us to abstract away from. By focusing on a single or small subset of
causes shared across individuals, we can make some sense of phenomenon that might otherwise
be impossibly complex. Doing so also has the benefit of providing researchers with a more
specified target for explanation. If this target can be understood, then clinicians may be able to
intervene and relieve patient suffering.
The exemplar model thus offers the conceptual tools to support a distinction between
ADHD and more progressed externalizing disorders because it allows us to focus on disrupted
PFC maturation as a causal factor that is shared amongst those that depart from the ADHD
exemplar while abstracting away from the details of individual variation. The basis for this
distinction relates to differences in the disorder’s course and outcome. Since individuals with
delayed PFC maturation have notably different experiences and outcomes from others in the
exemplar, we can establish delayed PFC maturation as the locus of a distinct sub-group within
the larger category of externalizing disorders. Other causes, such as social-environmental factors
might also provide plausible loci for distinguishing sub-groups if classifying them as such allows
us to develop better targets for explanation and intervention.
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4.3

Genetic Risk for ASD
That ASD is highly heritable, and thus demands at least a partial genetic explanation, is

evidenced by familial clustering of ASD (Devlin and Scherer, 2012). Estimates of the risk that
genetics confer on ASD manifestation range from ASD contributing between 60% and 90% of
total liability (Gaugler et al., 2014; Constantino, 2018). Studying the genetics of autism spectrum
disorder (ASD) provides an opportunity to explore both multicausality and causal heterogeneity.
Additionally, the messiness of understanding the genetics of ASD affords an appreciation of the
difficulty in relating genetic factors to disease phenotypes. Much of the genetic risk for ASD is
shared with other conditions. To help understand these complexities, I begin this section with
some background on two competing theories in genetics research: the common disease common
variants hypothesis and the common disease rare variants hypothesis. I introduce the concept of
missing heritability before reviewing research on the genetics of autism.
The search for risk-conferring genetic variants of complex diseases has historically been
driven by adherents to one of two hypotheses.9 The first is the common disease common variants
(CDCV) hypothesis; the second is the common disease rare variants (CDRV) hypothesis. The
CDCV hypothesis predicts that the risk-conferring genetic variants for complex diseases will
consist of many common variations with low-penetrance acting additively to manifest the disease
phenotype.10 The CDRV hypothesis predicts that rare variations with high penetrance are
primarily responsible for disease manifestation (Schork et al., 2009).11 While it is accepted that

“Complex” or “multifactorial” diseases are those that are caused by a number of contributing factors, spanning
from genes to the environment. In this way, multifactorial diseases already conform to Ross’s notion of multicausal.
10
“Penetrance” is determined by the relation between the presence of a gene variant and the manifestation of a
phenotype. A 1:1 correspondence is fully penetrant.
11
“Common” variants are those that occur at a rate greater than 1% of the population. “Rare” variants are those that
occur at a rate lower than 1% of the population.
9
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both common and rare variants contribute to one’s overall genetic liability, debate still surrounds
the relative role each plays (ibid.).
State and Levitt (2011) explore the CDCV and CDRV hypotheses as they relate to ASD.
Starting from the observation that studies have historically overestimated the effects of specific
alleles, State and Levitt introduce the concept of missing heritability. Missing heritability occurs
when the identified genetic risk factors only account for a portion of one’s liability. The authors
note several potential explanations for missing heritability, all of which appear to have some
accuracy to them. First, it is possible to have overestimated the role of genetic variations in
producing the phenotype. To the extent that this is correct, we should emphasize the search for
environmental and developmental factors that interact with genetic risks to produce a disease
phenotype. Second, the CDCV hypothesis could be correct, and we could have, as of now, failed
to identify most of the genetic risk factors (all of small effect size). Third, the CDRV hypothesis
could be correct, and we could have, as of this study, failed to identify the relevant rare
variations.
Taking these possibilities for explaining missing heritability and applying them to the
case of ASD, State and Levitt review what we know about contributions from rare and common
genetic variations. Genome-wide association studies (GWAS) have so far failed to identify
promising replicable results regarding common variants. More promising results have come from
studying rare de novo copy number variants. However, studies have still been unable to identify
variants that can explain more than a small subset of individuals. The authors note two studies
that independently identify roughly 300 de novo CNVs related to ASD (p. 1502).
In summary, to the extent that psychiatric disorders are similar to ASD, we should expect
several things. First, we should not expect to find fully penetrant genetic variations. This will
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prevent us from identifying necessary and sufficient genetic causes of psychiatric disorders. We
should expect what Ross refers to as causal heterogeneity: we should expect that the genetic
factors contributing to the manifestation of psychiatric disorders are not homogenous across
instances of the same disorder. Thus, even though genetic variations are causes of psychiatric
disorders, it will be challenging to create a causal classification system that relies too heavily on
demarcating disorders based on their genetic causes.
Before moving on, I need to respond to an important objection. The reader may object
that the complexities I have been exploring are artefacts of research directed at an unsuitable
target. After all, earlier I pointed to significant problems with categories such as ASD. If we had
properly defined disease categories, could we expect better results and more homogeneity? I
believe this objection to be misinformed. While a better classification system might lead to a
clearer understanding of the genetics of psychiatric disorders, I believe it is likely that causal
complexity at the genetic level will always be present. In a recent paper, Craver et al. argue that
the relative lack of success in using genome-wide association studies (GWAS) to identify genes
of interest in psychiatric disorders results from poor targets and the inherent complexity of
psychiatric disorders (Craver et al., 2020). The inherent complexity of psychiatric disorders is
explained to be a result of the “soft construction” of the cognitive capacities involved in
psychiatric disorder. Soft construction refers to developmental processes involving decentralized
mechanisms, resulting in a multitude of ways for an organism to reach a functional end state
(Ibid., pp. 3–5).
For reasons pointed to by Daniel Weiskopf (2017), the exemplar model does not have the
resources to make sense of disorders that exhibit large amounts of causal heterogeneity. To make
sense of causal complexity, the exemplar model relies on selection (of certain causes) and
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abstraction. The causes we choose to select and use to define a category must be present across
individuals of the category and also capable of explaining a large amount of those individuals’
disorder processes and symptoms. While this is compatible with some multicausality and causal
heterogeneity amongst the various other causes producing and sustaining the disorder across
individuals, this minimum level of homogeneity will be necessary. Weiskopf’s contention is that,
in the case of ASD, finding even this minimum amount of homogeneity is unachievable. On
Weiskopf’s reading, there are no causal mechanisms that can explain any meaningful subset of
ASD patients, and thus no causal basis for productive distinctions within ASD (Weiskopf, 2017,
pp. 181–182).
As an alternative, Weiskopf (2017) suggests that ASD can be understood as a network
structure. The network model of psychiatric disorders takes a disorder category to consist of
many loosely connected patient profiles. Different profiles are linked by shared properties at
some level of analysis (i.e., genetic, molecular, neural, cognitive levels, etc.). For example, two
patients with ASD might share some, but not all, of the same genetic vulnerabilities. One of
those two patients might share some, but not all, of their genetic vulnerabilities with a third
patient, but that third patient might not share any of the same genetic vulnerabilities with the
other of the original two patients. The disorder category would be represented by the set of
networks representing these linked profiles at each level of analysis.
Network models and exemplars are not unrelated. Any possible patient profile should, in
principle, be derivable from a completed network representation. An exemplar model would
represent the particular subset of causal processes, at each level of analysis, responsible for
producing and sustaining that patient’s disorder as well as the relations between causal processes
at various levels. Any one of these particular patient profiles could be the basis of distinguishing
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a particular exemplar. The utility of exemplar categories, however, rely on the ability to choose
some subset of causal processes capable of explaining how a substantial subset of individuals
diverge from the larger category either in terms of etiology or pathology.12 An exemplar that
explains only a single or few individuals will not be worth distinguishing for classification
purposes. Network approaches do not require any such homogeneity. Individuals may have more
or less similar profiles across levels of analysis. The network model, therefore, accords more
closely with the soft construction developmental model Craver et al. use to explain the inherent
heterogeneity of psychiatric disorders.
5

THE UTILITY OF CLASSIFICATION MODELS

In the previous sections, I motivated the need for a causal classification system for
psychiatry, explored two approaches to causal classification, and explored challenges involved in
causal classification. Namely, the motivation is that current classification system, which sorts
phenomena according to clinical presentation, produces invalid categories. High comorbidity and
heterogeneity are evidence of the invalidity of these categories. Invalid disorder categories have
consequences for our abilities to explain and treat mental disorders. A causal classification
system would provide better explanatory targets and allow clinicians to develop more precise
and effective interventions. The challenges to constructing a causal classification system have to
do with causal complexity. Mental disorders exhibit both multicausality and causal
heterogeneity. In this section, I will argue that classification systems are a tool we have for

Whether the number of individuals a possible exemplar applies to represents a “substantial subset of individuals”
has to do with the proportion of individuals the exemplar can apply to in relation to the size of the population
exhibiting the broader disorder category. If some exemplar can reliably distinguish, say, 10% of the population
exhibiting some broadly defined disorder category, then it might be a worthwhile distinction to make. There is no
exact number or percentage that makes a subset substantial, however.
12
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understanding the world and evaluate the utility of the exemplar and network models in
satisfying three purposes of classification.
5.1

Classification Systems as Tools
Classification systems are not typically thought of as tools, but I argue that they are. We

can think of the principles of a classification system as analogous to the shape of a tool. The
shape, or structure, of a tool determines its function. Classification systems function to sort
phenomena in particular ways.13 We use classification systems to produce categories according
to the system’s principles of classification. These products have practical utility. By dividing up
the world in a certain way, we are able to do a number of things. Depending on how the system
divides up the world, categories may be used to make inferences, make predictions, serve as
explananda, or allow us to better visualize the phenomena we are working with.
The benefit of thinking about classification systems as tools comes once we realize that
tools are utilized in relation to some purpose. Different tools function differently, and particular
tools are well-suited for certain tasks and poorly suited for others. The same is true of
classification systems. Certain ways of categorizing phenomena in psychiatry will be helpful for
some purposes more than others. Given the variety of goals within psychiatry, e.g., constructing
explananda, predicting disease course and outcome, predicting response to treatment,
understanding disease processes, etc., we might expect that some classification systems are
helpful for some of these endeavors and less so for others. The rest of this section will be spent
demonstrating that this is the case: some classification systems are good for some purposes and
bad for others. Therefore, I argue that we should be pluralists about classification in psychiatry.

Of course, not all tools function the way they are meant to. It’s plausible that some tools are designed with the
intention of having them perform some function that they then perform poorly. This would be a poorly designed
tool. The DSM could be said to be a poorly designed tool.
13
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5.2

Variety, Purpose, and Value
There are a number of potential reasons to classify phenomena into categories. The chief

aim of psychiatric research and clinical practice is, and ought to be, treatment. Of course, there
are a number of possible routes to developing better treatment outcomes. Any route, however,
will involve utilizing a classification system that allows us to represent psychiatric phenomena in
a way productive for the goals of treatment. The following is a list of desiderata that
classification systems might satisfy as a means of representing categories productively for the
purposes of psychiatry:
•
•
•

Categories might make it easier for us to comprehend the relations between complex
phenomena
Categories may serve as explanatory targets
Categories may be useful for communicative purposes such that by telling someone that
John can be categorized as x, I pass along certain information about John

The first two desiderata are particularly important for the goals of treatment. Understanding the
relations between complex phenomena situates researchers to develop intervention strategies that
focus on shared vulnerabilities or, alternatively, might help us understand why some treatment
strategies only help some patients with a given disorder. Similarly, good explanatory targets are
productive for the goals of treatments because they help facilitate the development of
explanations that may provide the basis for new intervention strategies. The final desideratum is
particularly important in clinical contexts when deciding upon particular intervention strategies
and generating predictions about patient course and outcome. I will argue that the exemplar and
network models serve these interests in different ways. In some cases, one may be superior to the
other in relation to one of these purposes and/or perform poorly in relation to another. In other
cases, the two models may serve one particular purpose in different ways without being superior
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to another on the whole. The remainder of this section examines how the exemplar and network
models serve each of these purposes.
As a model of causal classification, the exemplar model has merits. The exemplar model
allows us to classify disorders with attention to causal processes without the need to consider the
ways these causal processes might manifest differently. This has the benefit of producing more
homogenous categories than DSM categories provide. Of course, the homogeneity of the
categories may not be reflected at the symptoms level, since the same or similar causal processes
may present differently across individuals. Even so, obtaining homogeneity of causal processes
is a marked improvement over DSM categories, which fail to be homogenous in any meaningful
sense. Plausibly, individuals sharing a DSM diagnosis often fail to share symptoms or causal
processes.
Categorization by exemplar also has the benefit of eliminating artificial comorbidities.
Artificial comorbidities occur when a classification system produces two or more categories that
may manifest as a result of the same or similar causal processes. As a result, individuals whose
condition is caused by some distinct causal process may manifest symptoms that fit multiple
diagnoses. For example, if the DSM categories MDD and GAD can both involve some causal
process(es) x, then some individual whose condition is caused by x may receive both the MDD
and GAD diagnoses. If causal process(es) x is used to distinguish a specific disorder, on the other
hand, then artificial comorbidities such as these would not be a problem.
Together, these benefits make the exemplar model beneficial for the purposes of
providing research targets and for communicative purposes. As research targets, exemplars
provide clearly demarcated explananda that are also causally homogenous to some degree. This
makes them well-suited for mechanistic explanations and pharmaceutical interventions in
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particular. As a communicative tool, the exemplar model produces categories that communicate
more about individuals fitting those categories as we begin explaining and understanding the
causal processes that distinguish the exemplar. Even an unexplained exemplar carries
information about the typical course of a disorder and the possible symptoms a patient may
suffer from. As we increase our understanding of the causal processes distinguishing an
exemplar, the category will provide even richer communicative information, such as what
intervention strategies patients might respond to or new methods for confirming a diagnosis.
The exemplar model proves less useful for the first of the three purposes. As discussed in
section four, a drawback of the exemplar model is that it has a more difficult time distinguishing
and representing causal heterogeneity. In certain cases, extreme causal heterogeneity makes it
particularly difficult to identify and understand links between causal processes at various levels
of explanation and patient problems. Distinguishing exemplars within such a context may not be
feasible. Even when we can distinguish various causal processes and typical courses of a
disorder, relating these to one another in the ways proposed by the exemplar model requires a
level of regularity and consistency between causal processes and outcomes that is simply not
present with some psychiatric phenomena. In these instances, there may be relations between
phenomena that are worthwhile for exploring but that are not represented by the exemplar model.
In comparison, network models, do well to represent the diverse ways broadly defined
disorder categories can relate to one another at various levels of analysis. The network model is
also helpful for representing mental disorders in ways that are productive for investigating
different kinds of interventions than naturally suit the exemplar model. For example, one thing
we might learn from network models is whether various cognitive therapies targeting commonly
linked symptom clusters could be helpful for ameliorating a variety of patient problems. The
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relevant information for these kinds of intervention strategies is represented by network models
as statistical relations, rather than as causal processes. Craver et al. (2020) have a similar idea of
how we might pursue intervention strategies in contexts of genetic complexity. They describe the
prospect of a minimum s-t cut, which describes the minimum number of links within a network
that would need to be “severed” in order to alter the output value (the disordered state of the
patient) (p. 9). For example, if network models help us to understand that some subsets of
genetic vulnerabilities are responsible for some significant proportion of one’s liability for a
disorder, then those vulnerabilities become the intervention targets.
Since the exemplar and network models are differentially well-suited for various kinds of
phenomena and explanations, neither can be said to be better, on the whole, than the other at
providing explanatory targets. Both systems sort psychiatric phenomena in productive ways for
the purposes of understanding and intervening upon psychiatric disorders and different
approaches to explanation and treatment should be embraced. The drawback of the network
model is its utility for communicating information about individuals fitting its categories. Since it
represents disorders as networks of loosely connected symptom profiles and causal processes,
knowing that some individual has disorder x, where disorder x is represented as a network, tells
us relatively little definitive information about how the patient presents clinically, what processes
are sustaining their illness, or about possible intervention strategies without additional
investigation.
In this section I’ve argued that the exemplar and network models of classification are
both useful in relation to three desiderata. I have, however, been largely focusing on how
classification can be a useful tool for research purposes. While research is obviously an
important component of psychiatric science, the other component is practicing psychiatry.
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Psychiatric practice takes place in the context of a clinic. Classification in clinical settings
presents distinct challenges. Clinicians have limited information upon which to base a decision
about how to classify their patients. That same complexities that make the DSM approach to
classification a poor one also makes it difficult for clinicians to classify their patients using
causal models. Namely, most of the information clinicians have relates to the symptoms their
patient is suffering with. The problem, as has been stressed throughout this thesis, is that
knowledge regarding symptoms alone very rarely tells us anything distinctive about the nature of
the patient’s illness or how to treat it.
In addition to having limited information, clinicians also have pragmatic concerns that do
not come up in research contexts. For one, each patient is different and, in many ways, unique.
Since classification always involves abstracting away from the details of individual variation,
patients will always have more complex presentations than can be represented by a classification
system. Also at issue is that clinicians have to classify patients for billing and records purposes.
This means that clinicians have to classify their patients despite often only having limited
information about their patients’ problems. As such, the classifications patients receive in the
clinic do not always communicate or need to communicate precise information about the
processes causing and sustaining their problems or how their problems relate to various other
causal processes and symptom profiles. Primarily, clinicians need to classify their patients
according to a basic description of the problems the patient presents with. Additional detail is
usually detailed in the patients “chart.”
Despite the inevitable challenges that clinicians will continue to face when classifying
what their patients suffer from, improved classificatory practices can still benefit psychiatric
practice. There is good reason to believe that new principles for classification will do well to
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improve our understanding of psychiatric disorders. Better explanatory targets and more clearly
represented disorder categories should help facilitate more productive research. Explaining
mental disorders and devising successful intervention strategies could finally provide the
therapeutic relief for which patients are long overdue.
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